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The Prince · Niccolò Machiavelli

By The Arms Of Others Or By Good Fortune

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private

citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some

state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows

it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they

might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also

were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being

citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill

and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and

unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the

position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it

is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command,

having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold

it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and

faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and

correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not

overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become

princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be

prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their

laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they

became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

[*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and

correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning

of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or

fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,

and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by

proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose

to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand

anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare

Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during

the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,

notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that

ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the

states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

[*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria

Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of

Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy.

Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to

Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to

the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and

along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an

account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings

of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino

nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which

is appended to the present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations

may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will

be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,

therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be

seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not

consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what

better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;

and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but

the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had

many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see

his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke

of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and

Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides

this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might

have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the

Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It

behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the

powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states.

This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by

other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would

not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by

dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came

into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of

Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from

him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the

reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the

Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to

advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did

not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to

say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using,

would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from

winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the

king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when,

after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very

unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind

when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany,

and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke

decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in

Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that

in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and

turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to

crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house.

This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving

at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin

to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung

the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless

dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the

French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by

trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse

to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the

mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with

all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the

Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his

power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned

their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good

foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of

Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,

he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of

notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it

out.

[*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak

masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave

them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was

full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing

to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it

necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer

Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest

power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the

greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not

advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but

that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the

country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had

their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused

some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the

people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if

any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in

the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took

Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the

piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The

barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied

and dismayed.

[*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great

measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if

he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,

for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake,

would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new

alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was

making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were

besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them,

and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the

future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the

Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him

that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways.

Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had

despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by

winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb

the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting

the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power

before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist

the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he

had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed

lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over

the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the

college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master

of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa

was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for

the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the

Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill),

he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at

once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the

Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he

continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander

died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would

have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the

forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and

he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the

foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not

had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and

whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,

they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made

Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would

not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death

of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the

day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had

thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and

had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated

that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to

die.

[*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

[+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad

Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to

blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought

to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the

arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty

spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct

otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own

sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it

necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends,

to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and

feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to

exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the

old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous

and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to

maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they

must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more

lively example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom

he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a

Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being

elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of

any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear

him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their

relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the

kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above

everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

[*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither

of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is

manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could

be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are

when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the

principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private

person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first

method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other

modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider

these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow

them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a

private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a

potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous

life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability

of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military

profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being

established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make

himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others,

that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an

understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who,

with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the

people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them

things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers

killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he

seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil

commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and

ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but

leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked

Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The

Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to

terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content

with the possession of Africa.

[*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man

will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune,

inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the

favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which

steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were

afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it

cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends,

to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may

gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in

entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered,

together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming

hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the

most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and

inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated

among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed

either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da

Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by

his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his

youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under

his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military

profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,

and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body

and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing

a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of

some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was

dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to

seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away

from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in

some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not

laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the

citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to

come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his

friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he

should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be

not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had

brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,

and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he

lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and

having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto

gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the

chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that

are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began

certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander

and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse

Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such

matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook

himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens

went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued

from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these

murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town

and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the

people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he

made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able

to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military

ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the

principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had

become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would

have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed

himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the

Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year

after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with

Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after

infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his

country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be

conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by

means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold

the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that

this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those

may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well,

that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and

that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the

advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,

notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with

time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are

able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as

Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to

maintain themselves.

[*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern

equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta"

than the more obvious "cruelties."

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought

to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for

him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to

repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to

reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does

otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to

keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor

can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and

repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so

that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given

little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in

such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil,

shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in

troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones

will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and

no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX