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Meditations · Marcus Aurelius

VI. Either with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine the atoms

to be the cause of all things, or we must needs grant a nature.

Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art

part of that universe, which is governed by nature.

Then secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind

and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred.

For of these, if I shall always be mindful, first as I am

a part, I shall never be displeased with anything, that falls

to my particular share of the common chances of the world.

For nothing that is behoveful unto the whole, can be truly

hurtful to that which is part of it. For this being the common

privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves

that is hurtful unto them; it cannot be that the nature of

the universe (whose privilege beyond other particular natures,

is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external

cause be constrained,) should beget anything and cherish it

in her bosom that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice.

As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an universe,

I shall not be displeased with anything that happens.

And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are

of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be careful

to do nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in

all my deliberations shall they that are of my kind ever be;

and the common good, that, which all my intentions and

resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it,

I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid.

These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldst

think him a happy citizen, whose constant study and practice

were for the good and benefit of his fellow citizens,

and the carriage of the city such towards him, that he were

well pleased with it; so must it needs be with thee,

that thou shalt live a happy life.

VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained

within the whole world, must of necessity at some time or other come

to corruption. Alteration I should say, to speak truly and properly;

but that I may be the better understood, I am content at this time

to use that more common word. Now say I, if so be that this be both

hurtful unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkest thou,

the whole itself be in a sweet case, all the parts of it being

subject to alteration, yea and by their making itself fitted

for corruption, as consisting of things different and contrary?

And did nature then either of herself thus project and purpose

the affliction and misery of her parts, and therefore of purpose

so made them, not only that haply they might, but of necessity

that they should fall into evil; or did not she know what she did,

when she made them? For either of these two to say, is equally absurd.

But to let pass nature in general, and to reason of things

particular according to their own particular natures; how absurd

and ridiculous is it, first to say that all parts of the whole are,

by their proper natural constitution, subject to alteration; and then

when any such thing doth happen, as when one doth fall sick and dieth,

to take on and wonder as though some strange thing had happened?

Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on

when any such thing doth happen, that whatsoever is dissolved,

it is dissolved into those things, whereof it was compounded.

For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion, of the elements

into those elements again whereof everything did consist,

or a change, of that which is more solid into earth;

and of that which is pure and subtile or spiritual, into air.

So that by this means nothing is lost, but all resumed again into

those rational generative seeds of the universe; and this universe,

either after a certain period of time to lie consumed by fire,

or by continual changes to be renewed, and so for ever to endure.

Now that solid and spiritual that we speak of, thou must not conceive

it to be that very same, which at first was, when thou wert born.

For alas! all this that now thou art in either kind, either for matter

of substance, or of life, hath but two or three days ago partly from

meats eaten, and partly from air breathed in, received all its influx,

being the same then in no other respect, than a running river,

maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters, is the same.

That therefore which thou hast since received, not that which came

from thy mother, is that which comes to change and corruption.

But suppose that that for the general substance, and more solid part

of it, should still cleave unto thee never so close, yet what is

that to the proper qualities and affections of it, by which persons

are distinguished, which certainly are quite different?