The Most-Read Classics
Catalogue  /  Meditations  /  XXVII. In matter of writing or reading thou must needs be taught
Meditations · Marcus Aurelius

XXVII. In matter of writing or reading thou must needs be taught

before thou can do either: much more in matter of life.

'For thou art born a mere slave, to thy senses and brutish affections;'

destitute without teaching of all true knowledge and sound reason.

XXVIII. 'My heart smiled within me.' 'They will accuse even

virtue herself; with heinous and opprobrious words.'

XXIX. As they that long after figs in winter when they cannot be had;

so are they that long after children, before they be granted them.

XXX. 'As often as a father kisseth his child, he should say secretly

with himself' (said Epictetus,) 'tomorrow perchance shall he die.'

But these words be ominous. No words ominous (said he)

that signify anything that is natural: in very truth and deed not

more ominous than this, 'to cut down grapes when they are ripe.'

Green grapes, ripe grapes, dried grapes, or raisins:

so many changes and mutations of one thing, not into that which was

not absolutely, but rather so many several changes and mutations,

not into that which hath no being at all, but into that which is

not yet in being.

XXXI. 'Of the free will there is no thief or robber:'

out of Epictetus; Whose is this also: that we should find a certain

art and method of assenting; and that we should always observe

with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds, that they may

always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable,

and according to the true worth of every present object.

And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it:

and to use averseness in those things only, that wholly depend of

our own wills. It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it,

that all our strife and contention is, but whether, with the vulgar,

we should be mad, or by the help of philosophy wise and sober,

said he. XXXII. Socrates said, 'What will you have? the souls

of reasonable, or unreasonable creatures? Of reasonable. But what?

Of those whose reason is sound and perfect? or of those whose reason

is vitiated and corrupted? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect.

Why then labour ye not for such? Because we have them already.

What then do ye so strive and contend between you?'